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## THE CHAIRMAN'S ADDRESS

DELIVERED ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1913, AT CINCINNATI, OHIO, AT THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION OF THE ASSOCIATION

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### SCOLARSHIP AND PUBLIC SPIRIT

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#### IL MAESTRO

Dottrina abbia e bontà, ma principale  
Sia la bontà; chè non vi essendo questa,  
Nè molto quella, alla mia estima, vale.

ARIOSTO, *Satira settima*, 16.

"The scholars of the world," said a speaker before the International Students' Congress at Cornell University last summer, "have often been reproached for their self-indulgence and for their lack of heroism in great crises, and, like all other classes, they have much to answer for." From venerable Oxford issued the other day an equally serious charge. We professors were challenged "to solve something which has real importance in practical life, and," continues our critic, "as the professors of the literary arts dare( ?) not do this, they would have a bad time, and could hardly make a living, if their subjects did not providentially happen to be endowed." This is indeed a cruel thrust, a veritable *coup de Jarnac* from one of our own guild. The author of a recent "best seller" tells us that the

present generation finds itself in a dilemma. "We have the choice," says one of them, "of going to people like yourself (the person addressed is professor of history in the thriving local university) who know a great deal and don't believe anything, or of going to clergymen, who—" but I omit the rest of that sentence and shall leave you to complete it.

Last year, Charles Tennyson, in a volume of reminiscences of the English Cambridge, noted the existence of "a certain inhumanity among the intellectual, and an aimlessness which comes from too diffuse a culture." About the same time but nearer home a sterner voice was raised to complain of "intellectual intolerance and superciliousness in the teacher, which should be educated out of him before he is fit for his job." Moreover, continues this *vox clamantis*, "there is a well-founded distrust of the capacity of the academic mind to set the standards for society," because the academic mind is "too reasonable, over-critical and afraid of action; it distrusts democracy, lacks the broad outlook and the human sympathy which should be the evidence of culture, and, in fine, exalts cleverness overmuch." Even the new President of Amherst College declares that "when professors are questioned as to results, they give little satisfaction. It often appears (he continues) as if our teachers and scholars were deliberately in league to mystify and befog the popular mind as to the practical value of intellectual work."

Notice that we cannot object that these criticisms emanate from regions "where ignorance wags his ears of leather"; on the contrary, all but one of these voices hail us from what used to be pleasantly known as the classic shades. And we are denounced in still other quarters. A man of the world, author of a recent "Plea for the Younger Generation," after complaining that Science and

System are the twin gods of the twentieth century, goes on to upbraid us in these terms: "O you teachers and professors . . . don't be so infinitely superior, so self-consciously clever, so ultra-modern." We would do well to appoint special professors of character "to supply the much-needed human note in our mostly inhuman schools and colleges."

It is probable that these animadversions point to some disturbing symptom in the body academic, rather than to any deep-seated or wide-spread evil: but to what extent are they founded in anything real? Boiled down, they accuse us professors of failure, or partial failure, in two respects: as regards our life in the community, we are said to be lacking in humanity and public spirit; as regards our pupils, while laboring to attend to the needs of their minds, we are not at the same time inspiring them with an effective idealism. Well-founded or not, these criticisms may at least cause us to pause and reflect; and they may stimulate us to clarify our conceptions of the calling wherewith we are called. To focus the matter I have ventured to propose for our consideration to-night these two propositions:

That to be satisfied with a scholarship which is devoid of public spirit is a reduced conception of the scholar's calling.

That as the religious temper is the best available source of public spirit, something of the religious temper should not be absent in the scholar and teacher.

No time should be lost in making three observations:

First, these propositions are not put forward in a spirit of contention, but merely for our candid examination. Unlike Dr. Pancrace I do not propose to defend them *pugnis et calcibus, unguibus et rostro*; I cannot offer, like the jovial Pantagruel at the Sorbonne, to debate them

daily for six weeks from 4 a. m. to 6 p. m., excepting two hours for lunch.

Second, by the expression a man of "the religious temper" is here meant any complete man who enjoys good health, just as, according to Cardinal Newman, Shakspeare was a religious poet, "exhibiting the religion of nature and of conscience." Would it be shocking to admit even Rabelais as possessing a good deal of the religious temper? It is true that because of certain glaring shortcomings of his he may at this moment be languishing on the seventh ledge of Dante's Purgatorio, but yet, as they know who have taken the trouble to filter his turbid stream, there is in pure Pantagruelism a great plenty of sanity, hopefulness, and constructive wisdom. Rabelais indeed might have furnished us with a motto for this address, he who wrote: "Learning and knowledge without conscience are only ruin to the soul."

And third, to consider these two propositions we need not, I hope, go deeply into philosophy or the philosophy of education. God forbid; such an excursion would be beyond our time and quite beyond my capacity. The philosophic Isms—pragmatism, activism, and the rest—are now as of old engaged in athletic struggles; mere professors of declensions can only hover, like Shakspeare's *Celia*, on the edge of the scrimmage and say to their fellow-spectators: "Would that we were invisible that we might seize the strong fellows by the leg!" Or we may adopt the wise attitude of the Boston gentleman who, on being asked whether he had understood one of Emerson's most transcendental lectures, replied, "No, but my daughters did." The younger generation, no doubt, fully understand all these things.

The second proposition, which calls for something of the religious temper in the teacher and scholar, seems to

imply that persons of the intellectual temper may generally be wanting in public spirit. If this really were implied, the history of scholarship would prove the contrary to be true; for whether love of truth or love of goodness has been their ruling passion, men of both tempers have been gloriously active for the common good. Take, for example, the two founders of the University of Halle, the first modern university. They were, as you know, Thomasius and Francke, professor of law and professor of theology. The former, author of an ambitious *Historia sapientiae et stultitiae* in three volumes octavo—ambitious, I mean, in the hopeful attempt to do justice to human foolishness in three volumes—Christian Thomasius labored for forty years against the intolerances and superstitions of his day. His was a rational mind with a great love of common sense. That he drew plentiful blood from his adversaries seems indicated by the fact that the *Universitas Halensis* was in those early days often referred to as “ein höllisches Institut.” Francke, on the other hand, was a deeply religious nature. In early manhood he was profoundly impressed by a certain passage in the New Testament; he tells us that it never left his mind, and that it became the lever of his whole life. His teaching of a practical Christianity assumed international importance, reaching even to the American colonies.

Thus both men, opposite as they were in temper, were fine examples of the public-spirited scholar. It does seem to be true, however, that the religious mind is oftener in the mood for active public service and has more staying power. If we compare Goethe with Fichte in the age of the first Napoleon, or Renan with Mazzini or Amiel in the time of Napoleon the Third, the contrast in mental temper is striking. It was Goethe who said: “I have always

kept myself as much as possible aloof from religion and politics." It is true that a great deal of water has flowed under the religious and political bridges since the sage of Weimar thus refused to disturb his Olympian calm. Both religion and politics were in his day waters more troubled even than they are now. But listen for a moment to the ardent Fichte: "The scholar ought to be morally the best man of his age. . . . Let him investigate as a matter of duty and not from simple intellectual curiosity, or merely to occupy himself. . . . The scholar must have a living and active integrity of purpose. . . . No one can labor successfully for the improvement of the human race who is not himself a good man, for we also teach much more impressively by example."

But the arch-priest of the intellectuals is no doubt Renan, he who wrote: "*Le savant ne se propose qu'un but spéculatif, sans aucune application directe à l'ordre des faits contemporains. . . . Spectateur dans l'univers, il sait que le monde ne lui appartient que comme sujet d'étude.*" And to the French clericals Renan said in effect: "If you will not dispute us our places in the University and in the French Academy; if you will not bother yourselves about what we teach or write, we will gladly hand over to you the country schools and the guidance of the common people."

Witness now the indignation of Mazzini at this attitude of cold detachment. The Italian patriot hotly retorts: "We are here on earth not to contemplate, but to transform. . . . Our world is not a spectacle, it is a field of battle. . . . Every existence has an aim: the moral sense and the spirit of action are indissoluble." And from his Swiss seclusion Amiel also protested that "the modern separation of the intellectual aristocracy from the honest and vulgar

crowd is the greatest danger that can threaten liberty. Scholars who, like Renan, are mere spectators, are no protection to society from any ill that may attack it." Amiel, of course, did not know that amid the clutter on Renan's desk there would be found, after his death, a stray slip of paper upon which he had written: "De tout ce que j'ai fait, j'aime mieux le Corpus"; that is, the monumental *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum*, a constructive work of the first magnitude. We shall do well, then, to dismiss this distinction of mental tempers as not essential to the present purpose. It was Descartes who said: "We should not conceive of any priority or preference between the mind of God and his will." This profound reflection may furnish us both the explanation of the existence of the two tempers, and a warning against disputing as to their relative merits. Let us return, then, to our two propositions, which call for some public spirit in every scholar, and a measure of the religious temper in most scholars. And first, what has been in the past the prevailing tradition of American scholarship in this matter? What has been our record as to public spirit and as to public service, and where does our tradition begin?

We are told that free intellectual inquiry—the *libertas philosophandi*—dates from Spinoza's famous *Tractatus* (1670). Halle, the first modern university, was founded in 1693-4, but the spirit of inquiry was not liberated there until about 1740. A decade later, Göttingen achieved independence of church control. In 1805, August Wilhelm Schlegel entered as tutor the Necker family at Coppet; in 1810 to 1813 appeared Mme. de Staël's *De l'Allemagne*, and this remarkable book contains (Ch. 18) these well-known and historic sentences: "The whole north of Germany is full of universities, the most learned in Europe.



In no country, not even in England, are there such facilities for gaining knowledge. . . . Not only are the professors [in these universities] men of astonishing learning, but what gives them an especial distinction is the conscientiousness of their teaching. In Germany, in fact, conscience enters into everything." Mme. de Staël then mentions by name Göttingen, Halle, and Jena. It is a capital fact in the intellectual history of this country that these sentences crossed the Atlantic and fell under the eyes of a generation of young men who, born after the close of the Revolution, were growing up to feel the need of a culture broader and deeper than the New World then afforded. George Ticknor, born in Boston in 1791, arrived in Göttingen during the historic summer of 1815, and it was four years before he came back to New England. "Germany," says Emerson, "had created science in vain for us until 1820, when Edward Everett returned from his five years in Europe and brought to Cambridge his rich results." Here were the beginnings. From 1815 to 1850 some 225 Americans are counted at German universities, and of these 137 filled academic positions on their return home. Ticknor, Everett, Bancroft, Cogswell, Patton, Greene, Prescott, Stuart, Longfellow, Allen, Lincoln, Lane, Whitney, Goodwin, Gildersleeve—these are some of the honored names of these intellectual pioneers. They might well have appropriated to themselves the well-known words of old Pasquier: "It was a fine campaign that we undertook against ignorance in those days, and the vanguard was in command of Ticknor and Everett, or, if you would have it otherwise, these were the forerunners of the others." They came to Germany at a fortunate moment; it was, as you know, the height of the Romantic ferment, and the northern universities were in a high tide of en-

thusiasm and expansion which began to ebb only about 1840.

What historian, a scolar himself and knowing something of the trade, will write for us the fascinating narrative of these our Argonauts? What great plans and high hopes filled their young minds as they journeyed uncomfortably by sailing vessel and diligence? Who in Göttingen represented to them the blind seer Phineus, who counseled with them as to the future journey? How deeply did they feel the atmosphere of high seriousness prevailing in intellectual studies? Were they not toucht with enthusiasm at their first perceptions of a method which directed their acute and eager minds straight to the sources, and which sifted and weighed "authorities" instead of merely citing them? What were their sensations when they contemplated the staggering products of the German *Sitzfleiss*? How much did they imbibe of the inimitable German *Akribie*? Can we not imagine them studying the dumpy *Gelehrte Anzeigen* of that day, and perchance hitting upon such bits of the scolar's ironical wisdom as—

Hätt' er etwas mehr gelesen,  
So erfänd' er nicht so viel.

There is no mystery about their choice of Göttingen, as against Halle or Jena, Oxford or Paris. Hanover was in those days English territory, the reputation of the professors and the size of the library had imprest even Napoleon: the Emperor of the French declared that Göttingen belonged neither to Hanover nor to Germany, but to Europe. Experiences at the English universities like those of Coleridge may have steered them away from the mother country—from Oxford and Cambridge where to be a *versifex*, a writer of Greek and Latin verse, was the

main pathway to distinction, while both universities were perhaps too acutely mindful of the very recent unpleasantness with "the States" to welcome Young America with enthusiasm. From Oxford itself Everett wrote, in 1818, "There is more teaching and more learning in our American Cambridge than there is in both the English Universities together." This was written almost a century ago: it is evident that even then, in the wingèd words of President Hadley, you could "tell a Harvard man a long way off," etc. In muddy old Göttingen, called by Ticknor the "land of gutturals and tobacco," the first Argonauts made themselves royally at home. Until our *Argonautica* shall be fitly written, we have, however, only glimpses of their interesting experiences. Ticknor wrote home that America did not know what the study of Greek meant; he compared the Harvard library to a closetful of books. Everett "blushed burning red to the ears" when a German *Gelehrter* pickt up an American newspaper containing a Latin address by the students of Baltimore to President Monroe: for the Latin was not Latin, and the language of the translation which accompanied the address could not, alas, be called English. The more mature Cogswell wrote: "It appals me when I think of the difference between an education here and in America." As to the faculty of *Georgia Augusta*, no doubt these young men felt as had felt, some time before, the Englishman Dr. Askew upon first meeting the encyclopedic Gesner, founder of the Göttingen library: *talem virum nunquam vidi* was Askew's solemn pronouncement. I imagine they were imprest much as in our own day Abraham Lincoln was astonisht by Carl Schurz: "You are an awful fellow," said Lincoln, as Schurz concluded an impassioned address, "now I can understand your power." George Bancroft, for his part, was not imprest to the point of being

overawed. Referring to his Latin oration delivered when he was made Doctor, the young man tells us that it pleased the audience, "tho some thot I spoke too dramatically. 'Tis not the custom here," he continues, "to declaim, but I chose to do it as an American for the sake of trying something new to the good people." This I believe is one of the first recorded instances of "letting the eagle scream" in foreign parts: would to Heaven it had been the last!

Like a church-spire or a mountain peak, the figure of George Ticknor looms up taller the farther we recede from his life-time. He was a hard and serious worker; his enthusiasm and gratitude for the new outlook given him were genuine, and he defended German science with warmth. At the University, he reports, it was Dissen, an associate professor of Greek, who taught him the most. Altho then a young man of barely thirty and of feeble constitution, "Dissen," said Ticknor, "comes entirely up to my idea of what a scolar ought to be, for he has at the same time a deep religious feeling, he has the desire to impart his learning and to do good." Edward Everett, after two years, took the oath of Doctor (September, 1817), but Ticknor after twenty months at *Georgia Augusta* went on to Paris, carrying among others three letters of introduction to Mme. de Staël. He had meantime received news of his appointment to the new Smith chair at Harvard College: the languages to be taught were originally French and Spanish. At Paris he found in the works of Barbazan and Raynouard material wherewith to study privately Old French and Provengal, but the public courses at the French university disappointed him: "There is too much striving for effect, too little desire to instruct." He reports in the same vein that Villemain's

public lecture contained no "severe" instruction: as a whole it seemed to him little else than "a spectacle"; but the young Bostonian seems to have appreciated the lively spirit and the charm of French society. Inaugurated Smith professor in August 1819, Ticknor held this position for fifteen years. It is claimed that he deserves the title of "the father of all serious modern language study in America." Rather a formal and taciturn man, Ticknor freely gave of his best in counsel, and—what is perhaps more significant—he lent his books generously. He labored to liberalize the Harvard curriculum and did much to stimulate the idea of the necessity of great libraries to the welfare of the nation. To measure the solid worth of his *History of Spanish Literature* we have only to compare it with its immediate predecessor, that of Bouterwek, who was reading at Göttingen when Ticknor was there. Bouterwek's was a vast history of European eloquence (*Beredsamkeit*): George Ticknor, remarkably enough, was able to work himself free from the rhetorical preoccupation, and in this achievement he marked himself as more modern than his fellow Argonauts Everett, Bancroft, Motley, and others. Ticknor in fact belongs in a class of Romance scholars with Friedrich Diez and Gaston Paris, both of whom followed him at Göttingen and, like him, were among those who can easier bear the reproach of being dull and uninteresting than that of turning aside for temporary applause or for any other trivial reason from their far-reaching pursuit of the sober and often baffling facts in the history of the human spirit.

Ticknor's better-known companion, Edward Everett, had a career remarkable for the variety of its public service. He was at first professor of Greek, but later also Member of Congress, college president, Governor of the

State, Minister to England, United States Senator, and Secretary of State. In his lectures, Emerson tells us, "he abstained from all ornament, detailing erudition in a style of perfect simplicity; it was all new learning that wonderfully took and stimulated the young men." His influence was great: his graces of person and presence, his mastery of fact, quotation, and expression, the perfect self-command and security of his manner, all lent weight to his many public appearances. "Education," said Everett, "is the mind of this age acting upon the mind of the next. . . . The business of education is to assist the growth of our spiritual nature. . . . Knowledge is the faithful ally of both natural and revealed religion." He noted with real concern the scanty place assigned to religion in the new University of Virginia, while from his addresses it appears that he used his influence to promote the education of women, prison reform, the improvement of public sanitation, the temperance movement, and even the humane treatment of animals. Evidently here was a scholar who saw "all in the one as well as one in the all."

Longfellow, Ticknor's successor in the Smith chair, was only a short time in Göttingen (1829), but long enough to be impressed by the professors who studied sixteen hours a day and came forth only on Sundays. You have seen in print Longfellow's inaugural at Bowdoin College, 1830; it gives us a respectful idea of his scholarship and this is confirmed later by his version of the *Divina Commedia*, and by certain little-known articles of his on the Origins of the French Language, on the French Language in England, and on the Old French Romances. His conception of the scholar's method could not have been profound, for after his first return from Europe he wrote of that semi-learned fribble Ménage, author of *Observations*

*de Monsieur Ménage sur la Langue Française* (1672): "we have no fears," writes Longfellow, "of falling under the imputation of such rigid scrutiny" as his. While not an intellectual leader, Longfellow's services during his eighteen years of professorship, are important. He tells us that he "hated to lecture before small audiences"; no doubt he was conscious of power over a wider public. As we know, his vocation was that of the poet and public-spirited citizen. Edward Everett Hale, who was his pupil, reports that "We students were proud to have Longfellow in college, but all the same we respected him as a man of affairs." During the anti-slavery troubles, Longfellow, as he tells us, longed to "do something in my humble way for the great cause of negro emancipation," and he issued in favor of the movement a pamphlet which brought him his share of popular odium. His religious temper is revealed by his verdict upon Fichte's Jena addresses on the Vocation of the Scholar: "Nobly done!" exclaims Longfellow, "and from the highest point of view. To Fichte's doctrine of the Divine Idea must every scholar conform himself." He himself went to the polls, and in the early war-time found it "disheartening to see how little sympathy there is in the hearts of young men here for freedom and great ideas."

Lowell, Longfellow's successor in 1855, and once the honored president of this Association, had a wider range of mind than either of his predecessors. The genial and prolific Mr. Saintsbury sees in Lowell the main apostle of criticism in America; for our purposes we may merely note that Lowell declared that he would make out of every youth at college "a man of culture, a man of intellectual resource, a man of public spirit." The manifold public services of the brilliant and kindly Lowell are too

recent and too well known to need rehearsal here. He once confest to his friend Curtis:

I love too well the pleasures of retreat,  
Safe from the crowd and cloistered from the street;  
I sank too deep in this soft-stuffed repose  
That hears but rumors of earth's wrongs and woes;  
Too well these Capuas could my muscles waste,  
Not void of toils, but toils of choice and taste;  
These still had kept me could I but have quelled  
The Puritan drop that in my heart rebelled!

Finally, the prevailing temper of all this noble group was well exprest by the serious Sumner, in his oration upon the True Grandeur of Nations, 1845: "The true greatness of a nation cannot be in triumphs of the intellect alone . . . the true grandeur of humanity is in moral elevation . . . Christian beneficence and justice." Or, if we hear-ken to Charles Eliot Norton, "the last of the Romans," we meet with essentially the same spirit. Norton wrote in 1895 to Henry B. Fuller, of Chicago: "I hold with the poets and idealists, not the idealizers, but those who have ideals, and, knowing that they are never to be realized, still strive to reach them and to persuade others to take up the same quest." Ticknor, Longfellow, Lowell, Norton, in the words of the poet,

These suns are set. O rise some other such!

But if we pass from these representatives of the Harvard group to a trio of scholars who drew their first inspiration from Yale, we find the same conception of the scholar's rôle in society. The life of William Dwight Whitney is full of instruction for the young teacher. "He possest," said Victor Henry, "not only a vigorous intelligence but also in the highest degree the power that is given by conscience and kindness." As another of his



eulogists has observed, he conquered the love of ease, the love of money, and the love of praise; he overcame selfishness and the pains of weakness and ill-health in the steady pursuit of his professional labors: the result was that, in the words of the aged Boehtlingk, "the distant future will use his works with thankfulness." It is told that Whitney made some progress upon a Sanskrit vocabulary the day his household was moved to a new dwelling. *Nulla dies sine linea* was evidently his rigid program, and yet he also took an open part in politics and lent a hand in the affairs of his community; he was both a good neighbor and a good citizen.

From Yale and Harvard a good deal of this spirit was transferred to Johns Hopkins in 1876, by Gilman and his close friend and adviser, Andrew D. White. Ex-President Eliot gave the opening address; Child and Lowell lectured in Baltimore soon after the opening. "The object of the University," declared Gilman, "is to develop character, to make men," while Eliot saw in universities "fountains of spiritual and moral power. These contribute to the true greatness of a state, which consists in immaterial or spiritual things, in the purity, fortitude, and uprightness of their people. . . . Above all, here may many generations of manly youth learn righteousness."

For an institution where the physical and medical sciences have always been most prominent, one might find a surprising amount of "the ethical preoccupation" in these utterances. And one might wonder why, with so religious an aim, it was announced from the same platform that a faculty of theology "is not now proposed." We must remember that in those days theology, the ancient and legitimate queen of the sciences, was a Queen of

Sheba, abasht and silent before the infallible wisdom of the scientific Solomons. Personally, I believe it forever impossible for a university to shape the Complete Man and ignore two of the most ancient and fundamental of human institutions, the Church and the Law: the absence of these two disciplines means a more or less narrow professionalism. But this ideal of the Complete Man makes me wander, like Aucassin in search of Nicolette, away from the highway. My subject is public spirit in American scholars, and we hardly need to be reminded that Gilman was a man of open mind, and of conscientious and generous concern for the public welfare. "Wisdom," said James Bryce, "grows out of the temper and heart of a man as well as out of his intellect. Where there is practical work and delicate work to be done, insight and sympathy must go together. They were happily united in Gilman, and to their union in him your University largely owes its present high position."

Is it not sufficiently apparent, even from this mere *pochade*, that a public-spirited scholarship has been the ideal of our intellectual leaders from Ticknor to Gilman, Angell, Eliot, and Hadley? Review all that America accomplished in the 19th century towards religious toleration, towards the extension of suffrage, toward the liberal treatment of immigrants, toward the discontinuance of war, and toward the general diffusion of education and well-being: it is certain that underneath all these movements there has been noble endeavor, determined effort, and a strong moral purpose. And there is a vital connection between these two facts: the public-spirited ideal of scholarship has had its share, along with other forces, in bringing these results to pass. The conclusion is that for us any other idea or conception of the rôle of

scholarship is un-American. "The necessity of bringing all our special investigations into relations with the whole body of philological work, with the life of the world" has been laid before us as his weightiest message by the Nestor of American scholars, Gildersleeve, who asserts also that "the most effective work is done by those who see all in the one as well as one in the all," and that "the true life [of the scholar as of other leaders] is due to the consciousness of service."

They who are complaining of late that this ideal has weakened among us are, let us hope, only superficial observers. It may well be that our intellectuals have been intimidated by the overweening claims of the physical sciences, whose advance has been accompanied by indifference or hostility to humanistic studies. The religious tempers have been disconcerted by the apparent break-up of religion, not perceiving that we are assisting not at a *déluge* nor a *débâcle*, but at the periodic readjustment: confronted with a free and thoro investigation of religious origins and with a closer grapple with Oriental thot, the Church has merely been forced to a restatement of its truth. A third reason for the impression that scholarship in America has ceast to concern itself with the public welfare is the process, now going on under our eyes, by which the colleges are being blasted loose from Church control. This process, to be sure, is not yet completed: even now if we listen we can hear heavy detonations in the direction of Tennessee, and I am told that large orders for dynamite have been placed for early use in Virginia and elsewhere. But it cannot be denied that the old denominational college deserved well of us for upholding the ideal of public spirit before its graduates. The *Independent* printed some statistics as to the professions fol-

lowed by the American college graduates of the years 1796 to 1800, as compared with those of 1896 to 1900. The figures are presented as human forms of different sizes. Noteworthy in the data for 1796 to 1800 is a sizable young fellow who represents the graduates of those years who fitted themselves for various kinds of public service: in 1896-1900 this young man has shrunk to a veritable Lilliputian. The Ministry figure has also terribly dwindled: those who have profited by his dwindling are Law, Business, and—largest of all—Education, that is, teachers and scholars. Thus college deans and college professors have fallen heir to greatly increased responsibilities in guarding the public-spirited ideal of scholarship. No doubt this has been said often enough, but I believe we are not yet fully under the weight of it, otherwise the complaints which were quoted at the outset this evening would not have found their way into print.

One curious result of these three depressing factors in the immediate situation—the extravagant claims of science, the general readjustment of religion, and the withdrawal of denominational control of colleges—one curious result has been that the downfall of dogma has been often confused with the abolition of righteousness. How else explain that in academic circles words like 'pious' and 'virtuous' have lost caste to the point of becoming terms of reproach among those who have cut their eye-teeth; even 'benevolent' and 'philanthropic' are not without a shade of suspicion, while puritanical restraint and Sunday-school goodness have become if not anathemas then at least taboos. It is probable that Church and Sunday-school have deserved this fate, but it would be a serious error to assume that they must needs continue to deserve it; for Science has recently become much more modest in tone, there has been a remarkable revival of the religious

spirit directed to social betterment and to moral education, while college students show a much more lively interest in religion than they did twenty years ago. It is also well known that the anti-intellectualist philosophy—one which recognizes other sources of knowledge than the senses and the reason—is gaining in favor. Sir Oliver Lodge reflected this recent change of attitude when he said before the British Association meeting this year: "Emotion and intuition and instinct are immensely older than Science. The prescientific insight of genius—of poets and prophets and saints—is of supreme value, and the access of those inspired seers to the heart of the universe is profound." In Germany Fechner, Eucken, Kühnemann, Paulsen, and Herman Grimm, in Switzerland Hilty, in France Bergson and Boutroux, in America William James and others have advanced philosophies which have in common a series of affirmations: some of these are deeply significant for all those who would deal with life as a whole. The young scholar of today may find—no doubt many of you have already found—much that is vital and stirring in the message of these thinkers. If you cut yourself off from your social instincts, they tell us, you doom yourself to be a crank—yea verily, a crank of some sort you will inevitably be. It rests with each of us, as with all men, to help or not to help in making this world more inhabitable, a better place to live in. A real neutrality is unattainable: he who is not for the commonwealth is against it. It is the function of the trained minds to educate by example as well as precept the great neutral, uninformed public, and to dig channels for their vast energies. This expert guidance is all the more needed in a country where Church and State are separate and in which there is at present no one great unifying intellectual influence—no one great city, no uni-

versal military service, no national university, no single great newspaper. The new philosophy further reminds the scholar that any truth is helpless until some man or woman takes it up and acts upon it, and that from time to time the professor "in spectacles and starched shirt" should be that man. Some principle, some central purpose should inform his studies and his teaching, to give them dynamic and steadiness. He needs the grip of some such principle as this to counteract the influence of extreme specialization, a matter which we may now take a moment to consider.

"To see all in the one" is no doubt the right ideal for the young scholar, but we know that in practice specialization works against this ideal. If one is to fight with his strongest arm and make his talent tell where it will be the most effective (and best paid) one must now more than ever seek mastery over a narrow field. Specialization is also the right corrective for much crude and uninspired work, for it is only the specialist who has a discriminating respect for the great achievements of the past. And so our academic public requires us to ignore an ancient maxim and adopt instead Mark Twain's modern version of it: "Put all your eggs into one basket, and watch that basket!" The time seems to have gone by when a poorly prepared young scholar could expect from his colleagues that vast indulgence which Anatole France tells us was extended to one of his fellow students: "We called him," relates the French *littérateur*, "little Raymond. He knew nothing, and his mind was not of the sort to take knowledge in; but he was very fond of his mother. We were all very careful not to expose the ignorance of one who was so excellent a son, and, thanks to our indulgence, little Raymond succeeded in all his ambitions. Even after his mother was gone, honors show-

ered upon him, to the great detriment of his colleagues and of science."

The enthusiasm which lies, as Ritschl said, only in one-sidedness is a real and precious working force, but there are too many of us who hug Ritschl's saying to our bosoms and make of it an excuse for a masterly non-intervention in community affairs where we might be helpful. And within the field of our own studies what except public spirit can keep our specializing within due metes and bounds? What else will prevent us from investigating entirely useless subjects such as (to use the classic example) "the effect of fishtails in motion upon the undulations of the sea," or from aspiring, like Richter's Fixlein, to the distinction of publishing a *catalogue raisonné* of all the misprints to be found in the German authors?

In France at this moment, as in the days of Rabelais, the Sorbonistes and the Sorbonicoles (notably Lanson and his school) are the object of attack: the complaint is that they are putting forth studies which the assailing party describes as *érudition sans pensée*. If the dissertations of the Lanson school really contain no *pensée*, no vital point of connection with the national life, past or present; if they are mere finger-and-thumb work or the lucubrations of those who would make a parade of learning, then these critics, belletristic or chauvinistic, have a perfect right to grow black in the face and talk of a *crise universitaire*. But all such critics, in France or in America, are either forgetful or ignorant of two things, first, that a lot of inside bricks and other coarse material that does not show on the outside must go into the building of the cathedral of knowledge, and, second, that if the *pensée* be new to the world, the young candidate, like any other scholar, is bound to show his proofs. Baron Bunsen, says

Max Müller, made the mistake of "throwing away his ladders as soon as he had reached his point," and Bunsen's works, tho by no means without influence, have been notably short-lived. Goethe was disappointed and angry because his discoveries in optics and osteology were received with a great coolness by the naturalists and physicists of his time: the sage of Weimar must have been unacquainted with that first principle of cathedral building which has been so well formulated by Helmholtz, that "theoretic ideas can be expected to attract the notice they deserve from those competent in the field only when their publication is accompanied by the whole supporting evidence—*das ganze beweisende Material*. My colleagues assure me that Lanson and his pupils may safely ignore the criticism that their work is unimportant or not co-ordinated nearly enough with anything the public knows about: the New Sorbonne knows that it is precisely because the public cannot always judge as to what is significant and what is not that the scolar and his pupils are bound by a moral responsibility as to what they do and what they leave undone.

An activistic world-philosophy working in the scolar is thus the proper influence to save him from going round "in an eddy of purposeless dust," and it will preserve him from the other traditional failings of his guild. Perhaps the worst of our professional failings, as Gildersleeve has said, is specialization for personal vanity. This disease usually attacks us soon after the examination for the doctorate. Some never outgrow it: they must exhibit their superior *Belesenheit* or their greater penetration. Instead of viewing their colleague's work solely in its relation to the Whole, they must pick here and there a pinpoint flaw. They secretly regret that it is not now as it was in the good old days when, in an acid foot-note, one



could roundly refer to the confrère who espied the weak spot in his argument, as *vir ineptissimus*, or *asinus praeclarus*. But more serious, to my mind, than vanity or vain emulation in scholars is the specialization which aims at money and social position. These inglorious Ichabods have their reward, but their punishment is that in the sifting process of time they must lose their claim to leadership and must see others who have not made "the great refusal" distance them in pointing out to the world the true meaning of life, the right field of action and the real grounds of hope. I believe it to be true, as John Dewey has said, that "the highest product of the interest of man in man is the Church"; next come the agencies for the enlarging and training of the mind. Church and School are the great depositories of the experience and culture of the past, and of ideals for the future. Our particular chapel in this great temple, our particular allotment in this vast field, or—to come gradually nearer to the truth unadorned—our particular floor in this vast department store is that where the modern languages are sold, or perhaps I should say, given away. The latest guess at the figures is that English is now spoken by 160 million people, German by 130 millions, and the Romance languages by 195 millions. There is nothing in our Constitution which excludes from our activity the languages of India, Japan and China, and I can see no reason why the Central Division should not, in the near future, shoulder some of the responsible work of interpreting Oriental thought and of adapting Western ideals to our neighbors beyond the Pacific. If upon serious reflection, the magnitude of such a task should seem almost staggering, we may yet remember that truth is always to be weighed rather than counted, and that from one point of view our task is comparatively simple. The very core and nucleus

of our teaching, that which gives significance to our goings and comings, is the upholding of the humanistic ideals; by these I mean freedom of inquiry, intellectual honesty, the disinterested pursuit of truth, and the courage, self-denial, and perseverance which are involved in that pursuit, and finally, the promotion of a social consciousness which shall be wider than national boundaries.

It would be a congenial task to develop here a chapter *De virtutibus eruditorum*; especially attractive is this idea of a modern confraternity of scholars, international in scope, representing to us what the *Civitas Dei* was to the keener medieval minds. Admission to this confraternity will depend not upon cleverness, but upon a sense of unity with and fidelity to the humanistic ideals. Have we not our enemies? Are not perhaps ten per cent. of our own population hostile to culture and free inquiry? Are not eighty per cent. if not hostile at least indifferent or distrustful? Must we not reaffirm almost daily the noble ideal expressed in Dante's words, *Nos autem cui mundus est patria?*

Probably there is no need to urge allegiance to this program before this audience: the paper last year which evoked the heartiest applause was one in which this idea of the higher nationality was warmly advocated. But I am afraid my effort and your amiable attention will both have been wasted unless we go on to realize that faith in the humanistic program comes only by trying it out—by application and experiment. We are not toiling ourselves or leading others toward intellectual freedom merely to find congenial pursuits and pleasures in the field of knowledge. If so, we have no fighting edge to our intentions and we need the sharp reminder of one of our most trusted leaders: "The more ideals a man has," said William James, "the more contemptible, on the whole,

do you continue to deem him if the matter ends there for him." To get some of our vision into brick and mortar, to do our share toward making our community more inhabitable, is the natural and proper function of the complete man or woman of whatever vocation.

It is also true that scholars and teachers need from week to week something of the refreshment of direct action. "Thot expands but lames," said Goethe: let me add that you and I need almost daily treatment and exercise for this lameness. Fortunate it is for us, tho it is the fashion, I know, to say just the opposite, that we have successive waves of young and inexperienced minds to deal with in more or less practical relations. If Jackson cannot get his dissertation into print, it is wholesome for me to have to convince somebody of the vast significance of dissertations in general and of Jackson's in particular. Then too, Art is desperately long, Life is fearfully short. The rate of progress in the world's total knowledge, won as it must be by the hardest of work upon the materials of human experience, resembles that of a glacier. To use a different metaphor, the great cathedral of organized knowledge is always building and never complete: scaffolding disfigures this or that tower, large parts of it are always shut off for alterations and repairs. Many who aspire to carve a cinquefoil or an airy pinnacle, or merely to square a humble stone for use in the foundation, never attain to so laudable an ambition: their rôle is reduced to that of personally conducting the flocks of more or less serious tourists who annually "do" the cathedral. To be bent upon getting more of the humanistic ideals into circulation will meantime help to keep us, builders and conductors, from many a pitfall: from laziness after we have reacht our saturation point in academic promotion; from falling behind and dissipation of energy by too

many *dîners en ville*; from discouragement and *cui bono*-ism of all kinds; from that insidious temptation to neglect the less well-endowed among our pupils; and from pettiness of whatever description.

Lastly, there is no doubt that the competence which is accompanied by some degree of participation in its application to public affairs, is good pedagogy. A serious medical student at one of our State universities said to me that the teachers who were known to be effective as men of affairs made deeper impressions upon his mind, even tho they were less able lecturers on technical subjects, than those professors, however brilliant, who were known to hold themselves aloof. Adolescence and youth are notoriously humanistic in their sympathies and ideals, uncompromisingly so. The President of Amherst College believes that the freshman year is none too soon to introduce young men to the urgent problems of our time. "I should like to see every freshman," he says, "at once plunged into the problems of philosophy, into the difficulties and perplexities about our institutions, into the scientific accounts of the world, especially as they bear upon human life." The teacher's sympathetic interest, his open-minded readiness to consider new solutions, his willingness to join and promote even unpopular causes are among the most communicable of mental attitudes: public spirit, in other words, is eminently contagious, and the student respects none of his instructors more than him whose class-room pronouncements are habitually made with the caution born of attempts to change conditions in this exasperating world. Experience should have taught the older mind that what Emerson calls "the sore relation to persons" is involved in nearly every attempt at progress. Progress, we are

told, is the effort to combine ideal novelty with reality, and it is the professor's duty and privilege to present the two—the real and the ideal—with such clearness, insight, optimism, and faith that to the younger minds improvement shall seem the next natural and desirable, nay the inevitable, step. In our explanations of texts—and we are after all an association of explainers of texts—we have often been besought not to leave off till our text has been “riddled with light”; with light, yes, but for the total effect of our work we must not forget that it takes more than light to make a fire that burns. We must add to our light warmth, and to our warmth motion if we would kindle and maintain a fire which, like Bishop Latimer's candle, shall never be put out.

The speaker at Cornell was Edwin D. Mead, of Boston. He believed, however, “that there was no other class which on the whole has been so faithful or shown so much true leadership.” The Oxford volume is Schiller's *Formal Logic*, reviewed in *Current Literature* 53, p. 551 (see also *The Independent* 73, p. 375). The “best seller” is Churchill's *The Inside of the Cup*. C. Tennyson's book is *Cambridge from Within*, 1912; *vox clamantis* is A. K. Rogers, *Popular Science Monthly* 80, p. 574. President Meiklejohn's Inaugural is printed in the *Amherst Graduates' Quarterly* for November, 1912, p. 65. The reference is to Cosmo Hamilton, *A Plea for the Younger Generation*, 1913.—The merry jest of haling Celia of *As You Like It* into a company of dryasdusts is not my own, but belongs to Professor J. Rendel Harris: see his essay, “The Art of Conjectural Emendation” (*Side-Lights on New Testament Research*, 1908). For Thomasius, besides Paulsen, one might reread Andrew D. White's article in the *Atlantic Monthly* 95, p. 520. What is said of Francke is noted by Harnack, in *Revue de Théologie et Philosophie* 30, p. 264. Francke's scriptural motto was II Cor. IX, 8: “*Dieu peut faire que possédant en toutes choses de quoi satisfaire à vos besoins, vous ayez encore en abondance pour toute bonne œuvre.*” Our English version is not so clear in its rendering. Thomasius also had his motto: *Acts* xxiv, 13-14. The passages from Fichte are taken from Smith's edition of his *Works* (I, p. 188). For Renan and Mazzini, see the latter's essay, “M. Renan and France”; for

Amiel, his *Journal Intime*, pp. xl, 178, 188 (Mrs. Ward's translation, 1889).

The invasion of Germany by Young America in 1815 and thereafter has been treated by Hinsdale, in *Report of the U. S. Commissioner of Education for 1897-8*, Vol. I, also by Viereck in the same *Report for 1900-1901*, p. 531 ff., and by E. G. Sihler, in three articles in the *Neue Jahrbücher*, 1902. None of these writers pretends to exhaust the subject; there is much additional material in the letters of Ticknor (see also G. T. Northup, "Ticknor's Travels in Spain," *University of Toronto Studies, Philological Series*, No. 2, 1913) of Everett (see also *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, for September, 1897) of Bancroft and others. The best summary is that of A. B. Faust in his *German Element in the United States*, II, p. 202 ff. For the condition of classical instruction in America in 1815, see Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, III, p. 453. The anecdote of Lincoln and Schurz is quoted in *The Nation*, 97, p. 261.

Dissen became *Professor Ordinarius* in 1817; he edited Pindar, Tibullus, and Demosthenes, but seems to have excelled more as a teacher and interpreter. "Little Dissen," wrote Bancroft, "is the most learned of the whole [group of professors of ancient literature, but he] is so sickly and so easily disturbed and brought low that his good will exceeds his powers of action."—The foundation of the Abiel Smith chair is described by Quincy, *History of Harvard College* II, p. 323. Ticknor was unable to make much headway against conservative influences in Harvard; he finally resigned and devoted 14 years to his *Spanish Literature*. Barrett Wendell, in his *Literary History of America*, damns the work with faint praise: it is "heavily respectable," and "not interesting." Similarly, Adams's *Catalogue of American Authors* describes Ticknor's work as "dull, but accurate." We presume the same shallow comments might be made on many another epoch-making tool, forged with wide aims and infinite toil. Everett's addresses at Amherst and Yale Colleges are representative (*Works*, Vol. I). Longfellow's articles are found in the *North American Review* April, 1831 and October, 1840. Lowell's words are quoted in our own *Publications* 25, p. 496. For Whitney see the *Report of that session of the first American Congress of Philologists which was devoted to the Memory of the late Professor William Dwight Whitney, of Yale University, held at Philadelphia, Dec. 28, 1894*. Edited by Charles R. Lanman, Boston, 1897; especially pp. 56, 62, 71, 88. For Bryce's tribute to Gilman, see *Johns Hopkins University Circular* No. 211, Dec. 1908, p. 23 ff.—The quotations are from Gildersleeve's *Oscillations and Nutations*

of *Philological Studies* (J. H. U. Circular No. 151) and from his *Hellas and Hesperia*, 1909, pp. 45-6. Anatole France's friend Raymond figures in *Le Crime de Sylvestre Bonnard*, where this quondam laxity is contrasted with the supposed pitilessness of M. Paul Meyer and the *Romania*. "Fishtails in motion" is an ancient jibe from the days of *la jeune France* (Wright's *History of French Literature*, p. 663). One may begin to read of the alleged "Germanization" of the Sorbonne in P. Lasserre, *La Doctrine officielle de l'Université*, 3me éd., 1913, 506 pp. (*Parvum in multo*).—For Bunsen and Max Müller, see the latter's *Chips* III, p. 385. For Goethe and Helmholtz, see the latter's lecture "Goethe's Naturwissenschaftliche Arbeiten" (*Populäre wissenschaftliche Vorträge*, 1876). William James's doctrine is in everybody's mind: this sentence is from the *Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals*, p. 292.